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Innovation for Agricultural Training and Education



Youth Violence and Citizen Security in Central America's Northern Triangle

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This document was written as part of a series of InnovATE thematic studies. These research papers examine a particular agricultural education and training (AET) system, cross-cutting theme, model, or technique and offer an analysis of the subject in question. These studies often highlight AET innovations in good practices or examine how agricultural education and training intersects with other development issues that are important to AET capacity building.

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Executive Summary

Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, collectively known as the “Northern Triangle” of Central America have consistently been ranked in the top five most violent countries in the world as defined by the per-capita intentional homicide rate. Honduras has topped this list every year since 2008, and in all three countries, the homicide rate has been increasing since 2004. The violence in this region has had a negative impact on development, undermining poverty reduction efforts, economic development, governance, health, and social and human capital. These issues also have significant negative impacts on the education system, the ability of youth (particularly young men) to find paid labor, and an overall fear of young men.

The drivers of violence in these three countries are complex and interwoven. Gangs, organized crime, and narcotrafficking are certainly a serious threat in the region, though in some areas gangs offer a form of policing and protection that are otherwise inadequate or neglected by weak governments. Weak judicial, penal, and policing systems result in relative impunity for committing crimes, and in many cases, these systems are directly or indirectly involved in violence. Issues of rapid urbanization, high unemployment, high levels of school dropout or non-participation, inequalities in social and economic opportunities, social exclusion of youth and marginalized peoples, and an acceptance of violence as “macho” are but some of the drivers and risk factors associated with violence in the Northern Triangle.

The increasing levels of violence in the Northern Triangle countries of El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are a growing and pressing issue for citizen security within the region. Reversing it requires community capacity building at multiple levels from building social capital, strengthening institutional capacity, improving economic opportunities, increasing services such as health and education, providing alternatives for youth to escape from intra-household violence, and more. This requires an understanding of the social, economic, political, epistemic, and institutional challenges associated with youth violence risk factors. This paper provides an overview of the current situation in the Northern Triangle, the risk factors for youth violence, current interventions, and the recommendations that have been put forth by various organizations.

Abbreviations and Acronyms

AET	Agricultural Education and Training
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
CSJ	Judicial Body of the Republic of El Salvador (<i>Órgano Judicial de la República de El Salvador</i>)
DACE	Academic and Statistical Department of El Salvador (<i>Departamento Académico y Estadístico de El Salvador</i>)
ECLAC	Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
IACHR	Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
IHRC	International Human Rights Clinic
INE	Instituto Nacional de Estadística Guatemala
ISDEMU	El Salvadoran Institute for the Development of Women (<i>Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo de la Mujer</i>)
InnovATE	Innovation for Agricultural Training and Education
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OSAC	Overseas Security Advisory Council of the United States Department of State Bureau of Diplomatic Security
UNAH	National Autonomous University of Honduras (<i>Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras</i>)
UNAH-IUDPAS	National Autonomous University of Honduras – University Institute in Democracy, Peace and Security (<i>Universidad Nacional Autónoma de Honduras: Instituto Universitario de Democracia, Paz y Seguridad</i>)
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WHO	World Health Organization
WOLA	Washington Office on Latin America

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Introduction

An important issue affecting AET programs in Central America are the rapidly growing issues of violence within the region, particularly in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras which top the list as three of the most violent countries in the world which are not currently in an open declaration of war. This paper aims to explore the influence of youth violence and citizen security as a cross-cutting issue that affects not only agriculture but all poverty alleviation and development issues.

Security has always been one of the States' main functions. Undoubtedly, as authoritarian States transitioned into democratic States, the concept of security evolved. In the past, the concept of security meant maintaining order, as an expression of the power and supremacy of the State. Today, democratic States are espousing law enforcement models that encourage citizen participation and that are premised on the principle that the protection of citizens by law enforcement must be respectful of the institution, the laws and basic rights. Thus, from the standpoint of human rights, when we speak of security today, we are not just talking about fighting crime; instead we are talking about how to create an environment conducive to peaceful coexistence. And so, the concept of security must place greater emphasis on activities to prevent and control the factors that generate violence and insecurity, rather than purely repressive or reactive behaviors to consummated acts. (Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 2009, p.7)

The high levels of violence in Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala, known collectively as the “Northern Triangle,” has led to a focus on the causes and solutions to youth violence by development agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The proliferation of violence is frequently discussed in the development literature, both academic and practitioner, with causality described as overlapping and interconnecting factors spanning from the household to transnational levels. The growing phenomenon of youth violence in Central America is a clear development challenge: “as the ubiquity of violence has shifted towards more locally contingent forms, so local communities have emerged as a critical arena for understanding violence” (Moser & McIlwaine, 2006, p. 91). At the community level, the factors influencing youth participation in violence are mirrored at other societal levels including weak institutions, inequality, poverty, social exclusion and poor social capital. The complexity and impact of this phenomenon has led to multi-sectorial and multi-dimensional approaches to reducing youth participation in violence.

Problem Statement

The increasing level of violence in the Northern Triangle has had a significant impact on development in the region. “Data is now emerging to confirm the common-sense understanding that violence has a devastating impact on a poor person’s struggle out of poverty, seriously undermines economic development in poor countries, and directly reduces the effectiveness of poverty alleviation efforts” (Haugen & Boutros, 2014, p. xiii). The complexity of this issue makes it particularly difficult to address and requires a closer look at the interplay of violence from the household to transnational levels and across key sectors including economic, social, and political sectors. Recently, there has been an increased focus on the concept of citizen security as a way of addressing these multi-sectoral issues. Citizen security is defined by the United Nations Development Program as, “the process of establishing, strengthening and protecting democratic civic order, eliminating threats of violence in a population and allowing for safe and peaceful coexistence. It means effectively safeguarding inherent human rights, especially the right to life, personal integrity, inviolability of the home and freedom of movement” (UNDP, 2013, p. 1).

The concept of citizen security is a shift from past efforts at reducing violence that were largely based within the confines of judicial, penal, police, and policy systems. The idea behind citizen security is to strengthen the capacity, transparency, and functionality of these systems but also the social, economic, and epistemic issues that contribute to violence from the household and community level and up. “First, we need to fundamentally change the conversation...the problem of violence deserves equal time with hunger, dirty water, disease, illiteracy, unemployment, gender discrimination, housing, or sanitation because for the poor, violence is every bit as devastating and is frequently the hidden force undermining solutions to these other needs” (Haugen & Boutros, 2014, p. 277). This paper will explore the growing issue of youth violence in the Northern Triangle and its relationship to citizen security. It will examine the historical roots of violence in the region, the past responses to violence by authoritarian governments, the current approaches towards addressing violence, and suggestions for future interventions.

Background

Defining violence, youth violence, risk factors, and citizen security

Definitions of violence vary in complexity. Some authors describe violence based on national murder per-capita rates, based on the assumption that murders are the most reported violent act and are thus a suitable proxy for assuming levels of violence of a more under-reported nature (United

Nations Office on Drugs and Crime [UNODC], 2011). Olate, Salas-Wright, and Vaughn (2012) operationalize violence for their study on the predictors of violence in El Salvador by categorizing violence into acts with the intent to harm, such as carrying or using a weapon, and delinquent acts, such as theft or stealing. Similarly, Heinneman (2006) describes violence in Latin America as a “heterogeneous phenomenon” that manifests itself through physical violent action. Berkman (2007) places his definition of violence in the context of intent to use force of physical, psychological, or emotional means for personal gain. These definitions are similar in that they focus on the individualistic act of violence enacted by one person to the detriment of another, typically for personal gain or perceived justice.

Other definitions place violence within typologies that differentiate between actors and intentionality. For example, Krug, Mercy, Dahlberg, and Zwi (2002) use the World Health Organization’s (WHO) working group definition of violence -- “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual, against oneself, another person, or against a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation” (p. 1084). This definition differs in that it is inclusive of both deprivation as violence and the threat and fear of violence as a form of violence in and of itself.

Other authors further break down the intentionality of violence by pointing out a shift in thinking of violence from terms of individual pathology to structural pathology (Jutersonke, Muggah, & Rodgers, 2009; Moser & McIlwaine, 2006; Perez, 2006). Moser and McIlwaine (2006) typologize violence into social violence, motivated by power and control; economic violence, motivated by material gain; and political violence, motivated by the desire for political power. They also point out institutional violence on the part of ministries, police and judiciary systems, health and education systems, and other systems and institutions that become “perverse” and reinforce violence (McIlwaine & Moser, 2001; Moser & McIlwaine, 2006). Hume (2008) takes this idea further by examining violence from the position of “epistemic” violence in which the silencing of knowledge and voice “normaliz[es] and naturaliz[es] exploitative systems” (p. 60). In order to better explain violence in El Salvador, Hume expands on the idea of deprivation and perverse systems to include concepts of silencing and the acceptance of violence as normative in his definition of violent acts.

When looking at violence in the context of communities, it is useful to consider these latter definitions, rather than a blanket statement of violence as a specific physical act. While there is overlap between such categorizations, it allows one to examine violence from a contextual standpoint in order to more critically examine underlying causes and how violence manifests. In this way, we can better

understand how violence is extant within a community and in what ways violence can be addressed at community levels. As such, for this paper violence will be based on the WHO definition as physical, emotional, or psychological force or power, threatened or actual, used for personal or collective social, economic, or political gain that either results in or has the high likeliness of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, mal-development or deprivation of another person or persons (WHO, 2010).

While definitions of violence are varying, definitions of youth violence are typically described simply in terms of an age variable in association with the above descriptions. For the purposes of this paper, the discussion of youth violence is based on the WHO definition, violence perpetuated by young people between the ages of 10-29 (Mercy, Butchart, Farrington, & Cerda, 2002). This age range includes the typical age range for participation in juvenile and organized gangs, which are of particular relevance when discussing youth violence in the Northern Triangle countries of Honduras, Guatemala, and El Salvador (Berkman & Bank, 2007; Mercy, Butchart, Farrington, & Cerda, 2002).

The importance of looking at youth violence extends beyond the age variable to a critical look at the risk factors associated with youth violence, or what makes youth “at risk.” Olate et. al (2012) describes risk factors as “any individual, social, or environmental factor that increases the likelihood of a negative outcome, in this case of violent behavior” (p. 386). They further categorize risk factors into individual, family, school, peer, and community factors (Olate et. al, 2012). Serrano-Berthet’s (2011) World Bank report categorizes risk factors into societal, such as poverty, youth unemployment, and urbanization; community, such as low educational attainment, school violence, and availability of drugs and firearms; interpersonal, such as poor peer relationships and family violence; and individual, such as lack of identity and alcohol abuse. Regardless of the specific categorization, it is clear that the risk factors for youth violence are evident at all levels of society including the community, making a citizen security approach to youth violence important and relevant.

Citizen security is a concept that has arisen out of the understanding that a focus solely on punitive and aggressive means to combatting violence is not sufficient to address the underlying causes of violence. This is particularly important when discussing the Northern Triangle countries, which have a history of authoritarian government regimes, oppressive laws that specifically target young men, and high levels of corruption throughout the government including law enforcement, judicial, and penal systems. As such, citizen security is an important shift in the thinking of youth violence that emphasizes a human rights-based approach. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights describes citizen security as:

...the social situation in which all persons are free to enjoy their fundamental rights and public institutions have sufficient capacity, against a backdrop of the rule of law, to guarantee the exercise of those rights and respond efficiently when they are violated (...) Thus, the citizenry is the principal focus of the State's protection. Summing up, citizen security becomes a necessary -- albeit not sufficient -- condition of human security that in the end is the ultimate guarantee of *human* development. (IACHR, 2009, p.8, emphasis in original)

A citizen security approach to youth violence focuses on typical approaches through rule of law and traditional justice systems, for example, but emphasizes transparency, eliminating corruption, capacity building, and improving the functionality of these systems. However, it also gives a high importance and focus on economic development, strengthening democratic governance, strengthening social systems and networks, and a focus on human rights (IACHR, 2009; UNDP, 2013).

Violence in the Northern Triangle: The current data

Accurate data on violence can be difficult to find due to underreporting combined with systematic corruption in the police and judicial systems that result in unreliable data. One common proxy for establishing the level of violence in a nation is the intentional homicide rate, as murders and missing persons seldom go unreported (UNODC, 2011). Table 1 shows the most recent data on intentional homicides per 100,000 persons in Central America and Mexico. The intentional homicide rate across Central America has consistently increased from 2004 to 2012, with the Northern Triangle countries showing extremely high violence rates for the region. Honduras has a particularly alarming trend with intentional homicides increasing from a low in 2006 of 44.3 per 100,000 to more than double that at 91 in 2012, ranking Honduras as first worldwide in intentional homicides. Guatemala, ranked fifth worldwide for intentional homicides, has remained somewhat consistent with a rate that has fluctuated (World Bank, 2015). El Salvador is the exception, having seen a fall in intentional homicides from a high of 70.9 in 2009 to 41.2 in 2012. This fall is widely considered to be due to a truce between the two largest El Salvadoran gangs (CSJ, 2015; OSAC, 2015). Nonetheless, in 2012 El Salvador was still ranked fourth worldwide for intentional homicides.

Table 1: Intentional Homicides per 100,000 Persons

Country	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Belize	29.8	29.8	33	33.9	35.1	32.2	41.8	39.2	44.7	--
Costa Rica	6.6	7.8	8	8.3	11.3	11.4	11.3	10	8.5	8.4
El Salvador	45.8	62.2	64.4	57.1	51.7	70.9	64.1	69.9	41.2	39.8
Guatemala	36.4	42.1	45.3	43.4	46.1	46.5	41.6	38.6	39.9	--
Honduras	53.8	46.6	44.3	50	60.8	70.7	81.8	91.8	91	84.3
Mexico	8.5	9	9.3	7.8	12.2	17	21.8	22.8	21.5	18.9
Nicaragua	12	13.4	13.1	12.8	13	14	13.5	12.5	11.3	--
Panama	9.3	10.8	10.8	12.7	18.4	22.6	20.6	20.3	17.2	17.2
Latin America/ Caribbean (developing only)	--	--	--	20.2	21.7	22.9	23.5	24.3	23.5	--
Latin America/ Caribbean (all income levels)	--	--	--	19.9	21.5	22.3	22.6	24.8	24.4	--
Lower-Middle Income Countries (Worldwide)	4.2	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.8	6	--

Source: UNODC, 2015; World Bank, 2015

The intentional homicide rate for all three countries is significantly higher than the average for all of Latin America, with Honduras' rates nearly four times greater than the average. This is particularly interesting in comparison with countries in Latin America that are considered "developing" countries, which overall have nearly the same intentional homicide rate as the average across Latin America. El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras are all considered lower-middle income developing countries by the World Bank (2015). When comparing the intentional homicide rate across all lower-middle income countries, there is a clear difference with El Salvador and Guatemala nearly seven times the worldwide rate of lower-middle income countries and Honduras an incredible 15 times the worldwide rate in 2012. These trends point to significant violence issues across Latin America, but with a particularly evident issue presenting in the Northern Triangle.

2014-2015 data were not available from the World Bank or the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). However, the governments of the three Northern Triangle countries publish frequent reports on intentional homicides as part of efforts to increase transparency. These reports give a slightly different picture of the current situation in the Northern Triangle. According to the National Autonomous University of Honduras's University Institute in Democracy, Peace and Security (UNAH-IUDPAS), the intentional homicide rate dropped to 68 per 100,000 in 2014. It is important to note however, that these data may be inaccurate. For example, UNAH-IUDPAS consistently underreports intentional homicides when comparing their data to the UNODC and World Bank data, at a rate of approximately five per 100,000 (UNAH-IUDPAS, 2015; 2014; World Bank, 2015). However, given this

error rate there still seems to be a significant drop in the intentional homicide rate back to Honduras's 2009 levels.

Conversely, El Salvador has seen a dramatic change in intentional homicides as reported by the El Salvadoran government with a minor decrease in 2013 to 39.8 followed by a significant increase to 60.9 in 2014 (DACE, 2015a). This increase can be traced to the failure of the gang truce that was formerly considered responsible for the decrease in homicides in El Salvador (CSJ, 2015; OSAC, 2015). From January through June of 2015, El Salvador saw a continued high level of intentional homicides at 44.6 per 100,000 persons in that six-month period (DACE, 2015b; 2015c). At its current pace, El Salvador will surpass the highest levels of homicides seen in Honduras at 91 intentional homicides per 100,000 persons in 2012. As evidenced in Table 1 above, the intentional homicide rate in the Northern Triangle is alarming. This is particularly salient when looking at raw numbers such as a peak of 4,382 homicides in El Salvador in 2009, in Guatemala a peak of 6,498 homicides in 2009, and in Honduras a peak of 7,172 homicides in 2012 (World Bank, 2015).

Violence, Gangs, and the Drug Trade in the Northern Triangle

The reasons for the extremely high homicide rates in the Northern Triangle are difficult to discern empirically. For example, the Honduran government gives some statistics on the possible motives for homicide in their yearly security report. In the years 2010-2014 the top motives reported for homicide were settling of scores/hitman (13.1%-33.9%), interpersonal conflict (5.1%-18.5%), robbery (4.9%-6.7%), and gang related (>1%-3.7%). It should be noted, however, that these data include 49.2-70.4 percent of homicide motives labeled as "unknown." While these data do not show the entire picture, it is interesting to note that violence associated with gangs, a phenomenon that is widely regarded to be of serious concern in the Northern Triangle, is reported as less than 4 percent of known motives for total homicides in Honduras (DACE, 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015). However, of known motives, 41.7 percent of homicides were attributed to organized crime and hitmen in 2014, out of 3,463 homicides with known motives. This is echoed in the previous years of 2010-2013 ranging from 30.9 to 38.9 percent of known motives for homicides. Given that between 49.2 and 70.4 percent of homicides have unknown motives, this number may be considerably higher.

Similarly, homicides related to narcotrafficking are a category that is not given in the Honduran government reports but is widely considered a major issue in the Northern Triangle (UNODC, 2011; 2012). The relationship between narcotrafficking and violence is shown in the 2012 report on organized crime in Latin America from the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC). In this report a

clear relationship can be seen between the municipalities that have the highest levels of intentional homicides and the known drug trafficking routes through Honduras (Figures 1 and 2).

Figure 1: Intentional Homicides in the Northern Triangle by Municipality, 2011





Figure 2: Known Drug Trafficking Routes in and out of Honduras, 2011



A comprehensive look at narcotrafficking and gangs is beyond the scope of this report. However, an understanding of the relationship between these groups and the high intentional homicide rate is important to understanding the challenges facing citizen security initiatives in the region. In particular, it is relevant to note that the drug trade is not always associated with violence (UNODC, 2012). “There is no inherent need for drug distributors to quarrel among themselves or fight with the authorities. In both well established and emerging transit areas, the quickest way to profit is to avoid conflict and so market interests tend to favour peace” (UNODC, 2012, p. 17). However, Central America seems to be the exception with a clear connection between increasing violence and the rise of cocaine trafficking through the region. Much of this can be attributed to two different groups who have competing interests: territorially bound organized crime groups and transnational trafficking groups (UNODC, 2012).

Included in territorially bound organized crime groups are gangs and crime families. The definition of what constitutes a gang varies in the literature. Authors distinguish between *pandillas*, *maras*, and newer institutions highly associated with drug trafficking. *Pandillas* are localized gang networks whose origins were to protect neighborhood and community interests but over time have grown into more structured gangs with hierarchies and ritualized systems of authority (Jutersonke et al., 2009; UNODC, 2012). *Maras* are street gangs largely comprised of deportees from the United States, particularly from El Salvador and Honduras, who were heavily involved in gang violence in Los Angeles. These youth returned to their home countries and formed networks and structures mimicking the gang activity in the United States, especially drugs and arms trafficking and the exercise of authority through violence (IHRC, 2007). *Pandillas* predate *maras*. Most recent are “new” gangs that have evolved from the *pandillas* and *maras* that are highly organized, extremely violent, no longer play any role in protecting the community, and are heavily involved in the arms and narcotrafficking trade (Jutersonke et al., 2009). “Today, traffickers are competing for a smaller pie under far more difficult circumstances than ever before. As experienced operatives are lost, they are replaced by younger, more erratic aspirants, each eager to demonstrate a capacity for violence” (UNODC, 2012, p. 18). Of particular concern, youth involvement in *pandillas* and similar but less formalized counter-culture youth crime groups serves as stepping stones for involvement in more violent gangs such as *maras* and localized narcotrafficking groups (Serrano-Berthet, 2011). Youth become involved with these “lower level” groups largely for economic and social reasons.

Transnational trafficking groups are largely concerned with the movement of drugs, firearms, and persons across borders and through the transit regions. Particularly relevant to this are

transportistas, who are the groups concerned with the actual movement of drugs. In Guatemala and Honduras, there is a clear link between contested trafficking areas and the murder rates along the Guatemalan and Honduran borders (UNODC, 2012, p. 11). In El Salvador the link between trafficking and the high level of violence is less clear, as El Salvador is not a direct transit route like Guatemala (which sees nearly all of cocaine trafficking through the region) or Honduras (which sees 87% of cocaine trafficking through the region) (Equizabal, et al., 2015). However, in El Salvador there is a link between extortion and the smuggling of migrants, which contributes to the high rates. Overall, it is power struggles and conflict over contested trafficking routes and spaces that are largely responsible for the high levels of violence in these areas. This includes conflict between *maras* and *transportistas*, between competing transnational trafficking groups, and from gangs that specifically target traffickers, termed *tumbadores* (UNODC, 2012).

What causes violence is change in the balance of power between territorial groups. Any change in the status quo, even when it is the result of the necessary and legitimate action of law enforcement agencies, can contribute to instability and violence between territorial groups. Any event that changes the trafficking landscape can precipitate contests between and within these groups, including unrelated events such as the Zelaya coup in Honduras, or changes in drug demand, or re-routing due to a natural disaster. (UNODC, 2012, p. 65)

The exact number of intentional homicides (and other crimes) that can be attributed to these groups is unclear. Estimates in Mexico and Nicaragua attribute nearly 70 percent of homicides to conflicts between traffickers and territorial groups, and 20 percent of homicides as related to conflicts between localized territorial groups (UNODC, 2012). While law enforcement, declining demand, and international efforts to fight the drug trade have reduced the flow of drugs (particularly cocaine) through the region, this has not resulted in a decrease in violence. These contending groups are now having conflict over fewer routes and territories, which can lead to more violence, rather than less. In economic terms, the flow of drugs through the region is significant with the share of GDP represented by the value of cocaine as high as 13 percent of GDP in Honduras and 11 percent of GDP in Guatemala in the year 2010 (UNODC, 2012). Other estimates put this number even higher at 14.2 percent of GDP in Latin America. In El Salvador the cost of violent crime is estimated at \$1.7 billion per year with gang violence accounting for 60% (Higginson, Mazerolle, Benier, & Bedford, 2013, p. 2).


Clearly, the narcotrafficking trade and gang presence is a significant challenge in addressing citizen security in the region. Some approaches to combatting this will be discussed in subsequent sections. While the overall intentional homicide per capita rate is considered the most accurate measure

of overall violence in a country, there are other statistics that are relevant when looking at violence. This will be discussed below using the data available for each of the Northern Triangle countries. It is important to note however, that homicides are considered an accurate view of violence because they rarely go unreported. As such, when looking at other crimes, it is important to consider that they may be underreported.

El Salvador


El Salvador frequently reports on violence in the country including types of violence, frequency, and prosecutions through various governmental organizations. A closer look at the intentional homicide rate gives an interesting picture of the overall issue in El Salvador. Figure 3 shows the breakdown of intentional homicides by sex and age from the years 2010 through 2014. This chart clearly shows that in all five years intentional homicides overwhelmingly affected men reaching a high of 92.4 percent of all homicides in 2014. Across all five years, half of homicides were youth aged 15-29, and nearly 95 percent of homicides affected those under the age of 44. In real numbers, this means that in 2014 out of 3,912 reported homicides, 3,615 were male. In the same year 3,189 of these homicides were males aged 44 and under, or 82 percent of all homicides in 2014 (DACE, 2014a).

Figure 3: Sex and Age Breakdown of Intentional Homicide Victims in El Salvador by Percentage



While homicides primarily affect men in El Salvador, sexual assault affect women. Figure 4 shows the sex and age breakdown of sexual assaults in El Salvador in the most recent years where reliable data were available. When looking at these data, it is important to recognize that sexual assault and sexual crimes are widely regarded as one of the most under-reported crimes, worldwide (Morrison, Ellsberg, & Bott, 2004). This is largely due to the shame and social stigma associated with sexual crimes, and the fact that the majority of sexual assaults are perpetrated by a family member or family acquaintance (Morrison, Ellsberg & Bott, 2004). Despite this, Figure 4 illustrates that sexual assaults are directed predominantly at women, accounting for nearly 90 percent of assaults in all three years reported. While the age breakdown does not show the sex of the victim, it shows a clear picture that nearly all sexual assaults are directed at those aged 29 and under, with over 54 percent affecting those 14 years of age and younger.


Figure 4: Sex and Age Breakdown of Sexual Assault Victims in El Salvador by Raw Number



Guatemala

Guatemala has ranked in the top five countries for intentional homicides since 2011, and has consistently ranked in the top ten every year since 1995, the earliest year that data are available from the World Bank (World Bank, 2015). Figure 5 shows that the intentional homicide rate overwhelmingly affects males, at a rate of approximately 88.9 percent of all homicides. Similar to El Salvador, the age range for these homicides is largely in the 15-44 age range, at approximately 80 percent of all homicides (both male and female). Nearly 50 percent of homicides are in the 15-29 age range.


Figure 5: Sex and Age Breakdown of Intentional Homicide Victims in Guatemala by Percentage



The Guatemalan National Police also report other criminal complaints (in addition to homicide rates) in the categories of crimes against the public order, person(s), property, sexual/morality, and other. Figure 6 shows crimes reported in the years 2009-2013 in raw numbers by sex of the perpetrator and location. This chart excludes intentional homicides. Across the categories, crimes are committed largely by men. The crimes most often reported are against persons or fall into the sexual/morality category. This latter category includes public drunkenness, drug abuse, statutory rape, incest, prostitution, pornography, and similar crimes. The majority of crimes are committed in urban areas, with a significant increase from 2009-2013 at a rate of 35 percent; whereas, the rural rate has increased

by a measure of 18 percent. By contrast, the population growth rate was only 9.2 percent over this same time period, indicating a significant increase in crime relative to the general population. In 2013, 51 percent of crimes were committed by youth in the 15-29 age range (86% by males), and 75 percent of crimes were committed by those in the 15-40 year age range (84% by males). This is consistent across the 2009-2013 range. Similar to the intentional homicide rate discussed above, this indicates an extremely high crime rate by men.

Figure 6: Criminal Complaints in Guatemala by Year, Sex of Perpetrator, Type (excluding homicide) and Location




Similar to the other statistics discussed in the figures above, reports of intrafamilial violence in Guatemala from the years 2009-2013 show that the perpetrators of violence are overwhelmingly males (Figure 7). In the case of intrafamilial violence, the victims are overwhelmingly females at a rate of approximately 91 percent. This table shows the top four types of intrafamilial violence reported from 2009 to 2013. Most often reported is physical and psychological violence (41%-45% of incidences) followed in order of frequency by psychological violence (25%-31% of incidences), physical violence

(11%-13% of incidences), and the combination of physical, psychological, and financial violence (7%-9% of incidences). Across the five years of reported cases, 93.8 percent of physical and psychological abuse cases were directed at females followed by 85.7% of psychological abuse cases, 92.6% of physical abuse cases, and 94.6% of the combination of physical, physiological, and financial abuse cases.

The perpetrators of violence are typically the spouses or partners of the victims as shown in Table 2, followed by ex-spouses or partners, parent(s), and siblings. Of the four categories given below, 71 percent of intrafamilial violence is perpetrated by spouses or partners followed by 12.1 percent perpetrated by ex-spouses or partners. Psychological abuse has a higher rate of ex-spouses or partners who are perpetrators at 18 percent of cases, as compared to the other categories where 7-12 percent of cases are perpetrated by ex-spouses or partners. Across the other categories, the data are consistent with 74-77 percent of intrafamilial violence perpetrated by a current spouse or partner.

Figure 7: Intrafamilial Violence in Guatemala by Year, Sex of Victim, and Top Four Types* (excluding homicide)




* Not included in the chart are sexual, financial, physical & sexual, psychological & financial, sexual & financial, physical & psychological & sexual, psychological & sexual & financial, physical & sexual & financial, and physical & psychological & sexual & financial. Included are the top four most commonly reported forms of intrafamilial violence from the years 2009-2013; Data Source: INE, 2015

Honduras


The intentional homicide rate in Honduras has been the highest in the world since 2008 (World Bank, 2015). The breakdown of intentional homicides by age and sex shows a similar issue as in El Salvador with over 90% of homicide victims being male. Figure 8 shows the sex and age breakdown of intentional homicides from 2010 through 2014 in percentages of total homicides. This figure shows that in all five years reported, intentional homicides overwhelmingly involved male victims. The age range seeing the highest level of homicides is the 15-44 age range at an average of about 80 percent of all homicides, and with an average of about 48 percent in the 15-29 age range. Within the 15-44 age group about 76 percent of intentional homicides are committed against males, with an average of about 44 percent in the 14-29 age group (UNAH-IUDPAS 2011; 2012; 2013; 2014; 2015). In 2014, the majority of homicides occurred in three departments: Cortés, Francisco Morazán, and Yoro at 58.8 percent of all homicides. Cortés, the department where Honduras' second largest city of San Pedro Sula is located, has consistently had the highest homicide rate since 2011 with a peak of 193.4 homicides per 100,000 persons in 2013. This is more than double the national rate. Of total homicides in 2014, nearly 79 percent were committed by firearm (DACE, 2015). This is consistent with previous years with homicide by firearm averaging between 79-84.6 percent from 2010-2015.

Figure 8: Sex and Age Breakdown of Intentional Homicide Victims in Honduras by Percentage



As noted above, sexual assaults are considered one of the most underreported crimes (Morrison, Ellsberg, & Bott, 2004). However, it is worth noting that according to reports sexual assaults in Honduras are targeted predominantly at females at 84.7-92.6 percent from 2010-2014 (Figure 9). Additionally, the majority of sexual assaults are targeted at girls in the 0-14 range at an average of 48.4 percent of all sexual assaults and 54 percent of total sexual assaults against women. This number becomes even more striking when considering that 84.7 percent of all sexual assaults are targeted at women and girls aged 29 and under. Of sexual assaults against only women, 94.6 percent of total assaults involved women 29 and under.


Figure 9: Sex and Age Breakdown of Reported Sexual Assault Victims in Honduras by Numbers



While homicides in Honduras largely affect men and sexual assaults largely affect women, assault and battery seems to affect both groups at a rate of approximately 47% for females and 53% for males in the years 2010-2014 (Figure 10). Similar to other crimes, those in the 15-29 age range suffer the greatest frequency of assault at a rate of approximately 43% of all assault and battery charges. The 15-44 age range accounts for 74.3% of all assault and battery charges. There has been some reduction in

the assault and battery rate with a reduction of 33.7 percent from 2010 to 2014, with the biggest decrease happening in 2014.

Figure 10: Sex and Age Breakdown of Assault and Battery Victims in Honduras by Numbers



When comparing criminal complaints between Guatemala and Honduras (data were not available for El Salvador), it becomes evident that the overall crime rate in Honduras (excluding homicides) is much greater (Figures 11 and 12). The two countries have nearly the same average number of criminal complaints over the five-year period (Honduras: 18,167; Guatemala: 18,341). However, Guatemala has a population that is nearly double that of Honduras. This means that per capita, Hondurans are nearly twice as likely to be the victim of a crime as Guatemalans are. The difference between violent and non-violent crimes (other than homicide) is more difficult to determine as the two countries do not report the data in the same manner, though it is clear that crime is a large problem in Honduras, in particular.

Figures 11 and 12 show the registered criminal complaints in Honduras by year and type. Data on sex were not available. Overall, property crimes have decreased over the 2010-2014 time range with

a large decrease in 2013 and an increase in 2014 – though still showing an overall decrease. Similarly, violent crimes (excluding homicides) have decreased over the period with a low in 2013 and a slight increase in 2014 – also still showing an overall decrease. Overall, the total property crime rate decreased about 14 percent and the violent crime rate decreased about 31 percent from 2010-2014. These results are promising though still very high for the region.

Figure 11: Complaints of Property Crimes in Honduras by Year and Type





Figure 12: Complaints of Violent Crimes in Honduras by Year and Type (excluding homicide)



Overall, these data point to extremely high levels of crime and violence in the three Northern Triangle countries — levels that are considerably higher than their Central American and middle-income counterparts. The next section will look at the risk factors associated with youth violence, particularly as they pertain to these three countries.

Risk Factors for Youth Violence

A critical look at the risk factors associated with youth violence is essential in determining appropriate mitigation efforts. This section explores several of these risk factors including the social, political, and economic factors. Youth violence in this region is often attributed to issues including rapid urbanization, inequality in social and economic opportunity, geographical location and its influence on the narcotrafficking trade, porous barriers, inefficient or absent institutions, and the economy created by the arms and drug economies (Heinemann & Verner, 2006; IDB, 2010; Jutersonke et al., 2009; Meddings, Knox, Maddaleno, Concha-Eastman, & Hoffman, 2005; Serrano-Berthet, 2011; UNODC,

2011). At national levels, the reasons for youth violence are similar, including social exclusion, poverty and inequality, urbanization, weak or perverse institutions, corruption, and a lack of social justice (Berkman, 2007; Heinemann & Verner, 2006; Jutersonke et al., 2009; Perez, 2006; Moser & McIlwaine, 2006; Winton, 2005). In the household, risk factors include intra-household violence, poverty, poor peer influence, and alcohol and drug abuse (Prillaman, 2003). Many of these same issues are mirrored at the community level.

Frequently in discussions of community level risk factors for youth violence, economic factors play an important role including high poverty, inequality, and a lack of viable economic opportunities. In some examples, the economic opportunities that are available, such as small-scale agriculture and informal economies are viewed by youth as undesirable due to the low economic benefit, low social standing, and highly physical nature (Berkman, 2007; Reisman, 2006). Lack of economic opportunity is frequently cited as a risk factor leading to youth participation in violence and gang activity as such activity creates a lucrative counter-economy and economic stimulus in areas where there is little or no opportunity for acquiring money and needed or wanted goods (Perez, 2006; Reisman, 2006; Rodgers, 2009). "A considerable body of evidence supports the notion that young men in particular respond to the economic returns of crime, and these returns will be perceived as larger if legitimate employment is scarce or non-existent. Thus, there is an argument that unemployment is a factor motivating crime and violence in urban areas in Latin America" (Heinemann & Verner, 2006, p. 75).

Economists who have analyzed crime and violence show that violence responds to changes in the expectation of punishment, in terms of expected benefits versus expected costs. Thus, the incentive for crime is greater when there is a greater return on illicit activities and when there is a low probability of punishment. As such, there are ties between police and judicial policies and the economic expected benefit of participating in violence (Heinemann & Verner, 2006). However, when opportunity for legal economic participation is low, such as in many lower-middle income countries, participation in violence and crime becomes a rational alternative (Meddings et al., 2005). This is particularly true given that economic development in lower-middle income countries is heavily dependent upon foreign direct investment. Foreign investors, however, are reluctant to invest in countries with significant violence issues: "...poor rule of law and corruption are most detrimental for investment implying the prospect of a vicious circle of escalating rates of youth violence linked to poor economic conditions further undermining the potential for economic development" (Meddings et al., 2005, p. 11).

Social risk factors for violence are particularly important at the community level. In much of the literature on youth violence in the Northern Triangle, social exclusion and poor social capital are cited as

primary reasons for youth involvement in crime and gang activity (Berkman, 2007; ECLAC, 2009; Heinemann & Verner, 2006; McIlwaine & Moser, 2001; Olate, et al., 2012; Peetz, 2011; Rodgers, 2009; Winton, 2005). Social exclusion can take many forms and can best be explained by a lack of resources, opportunities, and services that are available to mainstream populations (Berkman, 2007). For example, in Honduras, a lack of educational opportunities, a low perception of boys by educators, an increasing social perception of education as a “feminine” rather than a “macho” pursuit, and increasing migration has led to some of the lowest secondary school participation rates in the world on the part of Honduran boys (Jha, Bakshi, & Faria, 2012). A lack of participation in education has been attributed to higher rates of participation in youth violence and gang related activity (Reisman, 2006).

The growing concern over youth participation in gang activity in Central America is strongly linked to the breakdown of community. Communities that are socially excluded, such as indigenous communities, squatter communities, and other unrecognized populations have higher incidences of violence where formal police and justice institutions are virtually absent (Berkman, 2007). In such communities, a lack of or distrust in police and justice organizations may lead to vigilante justice and the use of violence to establish social order, such as through organized gang activity. “Social exclusion and violence interact in a vicious circle that leaves the socially excluded in a very hostile social environment where the borders between legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate are often fuzzy and uncertain. In this environment violence is used by a minority to acquire justice, security, authority and economic gain” (Berkman & Bank, 2008, p. 5). Young men in particular are at risk of participation in violent activities, though most residents of excluded communities try to avoid conflict for fear of escalating consequences (Berkman & Bank, 2008). Gangs establish a sense of order, social organization, and practical rules and norms through violence, where mainstream systems are defunct (Berkman & Bank, 2008; UNODC, 2012). “In many ways youth gangs are the manifestation of young people’s need to feel part of a group in situations of multiple exclusion and the absence of alternatives, yet this seemingly innocuous need can have grave consequences both for themselves and others” (Winton, 2005, p. 171).

A lack or breakdown of social capital is another significant factor in youth participation and perpetuation of violence. Social capital is defined as the “...rules, norms, obligations, reciprocity, and trust embedded in social relations, social structures and societies’ institutional arrangements that allow its members to achieve their individual and community objectives” (Narayan, 1997, p. 50). Single-parent households, frequent migration, intra-family violence, and poverty are all cited as contributing to the breakdown of social capital in a household and community (Berkman, 2007; McIlwaine & Moser 2001; Prillaman, 2003).

The erosion of social capital within communities is a particular risk factor to youth who, in the absence of security, may seek out other ways in which find the social relationships and structures that they are lacking. “Perverse social capital,” as described by Prillaman (2003), occurs when youth participate in violent groups and activities in order to gain a sense of community, identity, stability, mutual trust, solidarity, and social order when alienated from their homes and communities (Prillaman, 2003; Winton, 2005). “The aim of violence, as employed by youth, is to assert and reinforce their connection to the community, thus becoming visible. In this context, violence is used by excluded youths as a means of communication and participation with a community that otherwise ignores them” (Berkman, 2007, p. 12). This perverse social capital undermines more “healthy” community networks and relationships driving further wedges between youth and adult populations and causing a continuing cycle of the breakdown of community networks (Berkman, 2007; Prillaman, 2003). This breakdown of the community social fabric has led to “community” being perceived in some situations as pocketed groups such as a street, a few houses, a school, or a particular group of people within a geographic community (Winton, 2005).

Berkman’s (2007) study on social exclusion and violence in Latin America revealed that gang participation in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil increased among the poor as social networks and associated socializing mechanisms crumbled. Youth who participate in gangs report finding identity, solidarity, social networks, security, and protection through gang membership (p. 21). This issue is similar in the Northern Triangle countries. Gangs serve as a mechanism for gaining social capital while also excluding youth from other more positive forms of social capital. “The question, then, of how to maintain the benefits of gang membership, while removing inherent violence and its multiple repercussions, becomes critical... the causes of gang membership are fundamentally structural, rather than individual. In this sense, therefore, increasing young people’s access to economic, social and political opportunities is preventative in itself” (Winton, 2005, p. 181).

Related to the erosion of social capital in the community is Hume’s (2008) concept of epistemic violence and the normalizing and silencing of violence. Hume (2008) claims that much of the violence in El Salvador is the result of the breakdown of social structures during war time resulting in a lack of social trust within communities and a silencing of relationships. McIlwaine and Moser (2001) and Winton (2005) also discuss the “culture of silence” surrounding violence. This is in part attributable to the dichotomy of violence used to establish a social order in communities where little order exists, and that such a social order also perpetuates violence. Young people, stigmatized by this silencing and

normalizing of violence, are often seen as unworthy of trust, and are thus further removed from the community (IHRC, 2007; Winton, 2005).

Hegemonic masculinity, which is defined as the dominant and culturally idealized form of “being and doing” as a man, is similar to epistemic violence as the view of men as violent becomes normalized “where violence becomes a key expression of masculine behavior and a mechanism for ensuring continued male privilege” (Hume, 2008, p. 62). Hegemonic masculinities combined with epistemic violence results in the normalizing of unequal and violent power structures that become unquestioned and regularized. “At a local level, therefore, gang violence is at once both normal and scandalous, which has significant psychological implications for the communities affected by it... as a result, ‘community violence among youth becomes viewed as something routine rather than an unacceptable exception’” (Winton, 2005, p. 170 citing Clauss-Ehlers & Levi, 2002).

Intra-household violence is an important risk factor in youth violence, where physical, sexual, and emotional abuse leads to youth leaving their homes in order to escape the violence they are experiencing (Berkman, 2007; Perez, 2006). Intra-household violence is a risk factor for both male and female youth, but is a particular issue for girls, leading them to participation in gang activity. Girls who join gangs frequently leave households where they were experiencing physical and sexual abuse and join gangs in a supporting role, typically following a boyfriend (McIlwaine & Moser, 2001). While intra-household violence does not specifically occur at the community level, a lack of community organizations and resources to combat intra-household violence and to provide help for victims is relevant to the discussion.

A critical examination of institutions is important in determining the risk for youth involvement in violence, particularly in the context of citizen security, which depends heavily on functioning institutions. In the Northern Triangle countries, it is widely reported in literature that the judicial, penal, and police systems do not have the capacity nor capability of maintaining rule of law and the safety of the people (Berkman, 2007; Reisman, 2006; Wolf, 2007). “In those areas characterized by a weak state presence, armed groups tended to oversee and judge disputes within their communities, even among those residents unaffiliated with their groups... [and often] for their own interests” (Berkman, 2007, p. 10). Gangs and organized crime groups such as narcotraffickers are known to provide security, food, medicine, and childcare to community members in return for their silence on illegal and violent activities. This creates a dichotomy between the community members who are in need of such services and the violent means by which gangs and organized crime groups operate. However, the absence of

the state results in formal institutions being seen as untrustworthy and corrupt forces that further serve to alienate and exclude communities.

The functionality of gangs as a replacement for judicial and police systems in communities changed with the introduction of the aggressive national *mano dura* (iron fist) law. *Mano dura* laws in Honduras, Guatemala and El Salvador have led to extremely harsh penalties for even small infractions by youth, including for manner of dress and for having a tattoo. These policies have led to specific targeting of youth by police forces leading to a severe schism between youth and authority (Cruz, 2011; Hume, 2007; IHRC, 2007; Rodgers, 2009; Wolf, 2007). The result of the *mano dura* laws has not been a decrease in violence but rather an increase (Eguizabal et al., 2015; IHRC, 2007). As Rodgers (2009) states in his research on gang violence in Central America and the impact of *mano dura* laws: “From socially embedded institutions that displayed solidarity with their local communities, [gangs] became intensely predatory and parochial. Rather than protecting and federating local neighbourhood inhabitants, gangs now moved to acting exclusively to ensure the proper functioning of local drug economies in the interests of their members and associated local dealers” (p. 969). In addition, the harsh penalties associated with *mano dura* law even for small infractions has led to many youth spending time in prison systems that have become strongly associated as training grounds for dangerous and violent gang activity, further reinforcing the cycle of violence (Cruz, 2011; ECLAC, 2009; IHRC, 2007; Perez, 2006; Rodgers, 2009; Wolf, 2007).

Judicial, penal, and police institutions are certainly not the only formal institution that can reinforce violence. Other localized systems such as corruption in local government, community groups who act to the benefit of some and detriment to others, education systems that reinforce stereotypes of boys as violent and unruly, are all types of community institutions that can reinforce the risk factors associated with youth violence (Jha et.al, 2012; McIlwaine & Moser, 2001; Moser & McIlwaine, 2006). Perverse institutions can be considered institutions such as formal gangs, informal gangs, crime networks, unofficial militia groups, and other similar institutions through which violence is a normalized means of conduct (McIlwaine & Moser, 2001). Traditional formal institutions such as police and judiciary systems, schools, and local governments are considered perverse in situations where they reinforce or perpetuate violent acts (Hume, 2008; Prillaman, 2003).

The social, economic, and political risk factors are equally important considerations when looking at the causes and solutions for youth violence and for overall citizen security. These factors can be complex and overlapping and are not as straightforward as individual pathology. When looking at communities and youth violence, factors such as those listed above will be important in determining the

risk factors unique to a community and how these factors can be mitigated to deter youth participation in violence. The next section looks at the impact of this high level of violence on development in the Northern Triangle countries. While causality is difficult to establish, there is growing evidence that high levels of violence have a large and negative impact on development, particularly in regards to poverty alleviation and economic development (Haugen & Boutros, 2014).

Gender-Based Violence in the Northern Triangle

Gender-based violence is an important component in understanding overall youth violence as both a result and driver of the culture of violence. As it pertains to the larger youth violence issue in the Northern Triangle, intimate partner, intrafamilial violence, gender norms and behaviors (particularly masculinities), and the relationship between gender-based violence and gang violence are important themes. Gender-based violence occurs at all socioeconomic levels and social strata. This is in part attributed to social and cultural factors that make violence against women seen as an extension of masculinity, the right of men, and the normalizing of violence.

Sexual assault, intimate partner, and intrafamilial violence are major concerns in the Northern Triangle. These forms of violence overwhelmingly affect women in all three countries. It is widely understood that there is a direct connection between physical violence experienced in the home and the perpetuation of violence outside of the home (WHO, 2010). This includes seeing violence in the home against siblings or parents. “Domestic violence and the transmission of violent behaviors from parents to youth continue to play an important role in determining youth violence. In the [Latin American Countries] region, between 20 percent and 30 percent of adult women with partners report having been physically abused at some point in their relationship. In a landmark study in 15 locations across ten countries, domestic violence is correlated with physical violence in each site/country” (USAID, 2010, p. 2).

Recently, the increase in level of violence of gang and narcotrafficking organizations has extended to women and girls who have association with the groups, whether formal or informal. In cases where women attempt to join gangs in this region, typically following a boyfriend, they are often forced to show loyalty to the group with sexual acts with multiple gang members. In many cases, this becomes instances of gang rape and other severe assaults against these women (WHO, 2010). The pervasive cultural influence of “macho” masculinity has resulted in males associating violence with their maleness. The “macho” aspect of gender-based violence is heavily tied to discourses of hegemonic masculinity, such as the cultural perception of men as strong, dominant, and superior. It is important to

recognize that this enactment of masculinity is not even across socioeconomic lines. As Paulson (2016) points out, “some 600,000 homicides per year are reported in the Region, with a frequency 10 times higher among men than among women. In the Americas, half of all homicides are concentrated in the least-educated quintile of the adult male population” (Paulson, 2016, p. 17). This is consistent with the data in the Northern Triangle. This is even more evident when examining the life expectancy of men in the region, which is eight years fewer than women in Guatemala and nine years fewer in El Salvador (Paulson, 2016). Cultural norms and traditions drive young men in the region to be aggressive, violent, and to take greater risk than women (Paulson, 2016). This violence overwhelmingly affects poor young men where these cultural norms are exacerbated by economic poverty.

Impact of Violence on Development in the Northern Triangle

A 2007 UNODC report details the impact of violence on development in the Northern Triangle. The report echoes that of academic papers in that it shows that crime destroys social and human capital, is a deterrent to investment, and undermines governance. As Heinemann and Verner (2006) state, “evidence shows that violence consistently undermines development efforts at various levels and that it drives the depreciation of all forms of capital, i.e. physical, human and social. Most importantly, violence disproportionately affects the poor and erodes their livelihoods and assets” (p. 7).

At the individual level crime and violence leads to death and disability, which have a profound economic effect on the household. The cost of medical care, loss of productivity, legal services, and psychological impacts all impact development at the household level and beyond (UNODC, 2007). The physical impact of violence and crime is particularly salient for agricultural workers, where the impact of physical injury can be extremely detrimental to the ability to work. The indirect psychological effects have lasting impacts on development, as people adopt avoidance behaviors such as limiting mobility, limiting access to services that require travel such as markets and education, and avoiding public transportation (UNODC, 2007). These avoidance behaviors also result in the breakdown of social capital within the community as fear of violence erodes relationships and contact among community members. “If development is the process of building societies that work, crime acts as a kind of ‘anti-development’, destroying the trust relations on which society is based” (UNODC, 2007, p. 73).

High levels of crime and violence deter investment, particularly from foreign direct investors (Meddings et al., 2005; Serrano-Berthett, 2011; UNODC, 2007; World Bank, 2005). The 2005 World Development Report underscores the significance of this issue. Over 50 percent of foreign corporations surveyed citing concerns in investing in Latin America due to the high levels of violence. Within Central

America, a survey of constraints to business revealed that crime and corruption are the biggest risks to business in the region. Of 455 Guatemalan businesses surveyed, more than 80 percent said that crime was a major deterrent to business (compared to a global average of 23 percent). Guatemala ranked fourth of the 53 countries surveyed by World Bank in regard to direct economic losses from crime at an average of 25 percent of total sales. Additionally, over 80 percent of the businesses surveyed stated that corruption is a significant constraint with 58 percent of businesses reporting paying bribes, amounting to about seven percent of total sales in the most severe cases (UNODC, 2007; World Bank, 2005). Similar results were reported in Honduras where 61 percent of businesses found corruption and crime to be the biggest constraint to business, the third highest rate reported (UNODC, 2007; World Bank, 2005). Losses from crime were reported at about three percent of total sales, though 50 percent reported having to pay bribes at an average loss of six percent of total sales. The World Bank report did not report on businesses operating in El Salvador. However, it does state that in the year 2000 nearly 25 percent of the total GDP of El Salvador was lost to crime and violence (World Bank, 2005).

Crime and violence also directly influence economic growth through lost wages and labor and the weakening of formal economic systems. Serrano-Berthett (2011), estimates that a ten percent reduction in the violence in Central American countries would increase annual economic growth by at least one percent (p. ii). Intangible capital, or non-physical assets, are also negatively impacted by violence:

The most important institutions for generating economic development [are] rule of law institutions (including the criminal justice system) accounting for a whopping 57 percent of a nation's intangible wealth. While an investment boosting educational institutions by 1 percent increased intangible capital by 0.53 percent, a 1 percent increase in rule of law institutions increases intangible capital by 0.83 percent... investments in education and the justice systems are the most important means of increasing the intangible-capital component of wealth. (Haugen & Boutros, 2014, p. 157)

While investing in the justice system is extremely important both economically and for law enforcement and citizen security, there are major issues facing the efficacy of and trust in these systems in the Northern Triangle. Haugen and Boutros (2014) in *The Locust Effect: Why the End of Poverty Requires the End of Violence* give compelling evidence that three situations are largely responsible for the continued cycle of violence in developing countries: corruption in government, police, judicial, and penal systems; ineffective and broken legal systems; and, the legacy of colonialism in institutions that protect the rich at the expense of the poor. These issues not only harm development initiatives, but in many cases completely negate development efforts and are directly related to a lack of citizen security

(Haugen & Boutros, 2014). The perversion of law enforcement and judicial institutions is a significant issue in the Northern Triangle countries as it pertains to citizen security. A major focus of citizen security is the functionality and transparency of these systems. Currently in the Northern Triangle countries, the systems of law enforcement are widely seen to be corrupt institutions that increase rather than reduce crime and violence – in part due to the *mano dura* policies and the long-term impact of these policies even in cases where they have been removed.

The lack of efficacy and distrust in the police systems lead to the privatization of security: The privatization of basic citizen security is pervasive in Guatemala, where there are nearly seven private security guards for every one public police officer. In Honduras, the nation's private security forces are four times larger than the public police force. The private security apparatus is being secured for the wealthy *in the absence of (and as a private substitute for)* a reasonably functioning public justice system that can provide basic law and order to the general public. (Haugen & Boutros, 2014, p. 144, emphasis in original)

This privatization of security services privileges the wealthy who can afford such services, but leaves the poor in a situation where the law enforcement system has decayed to a point of functional failure, leaving the poor without a defender (Haugen & Boutros, 2014, p. 144). With the failure of law enforcement systems, the wealthy are able to purchase services that become unavailable to the poor, leaving the poor at greater risk of crime and violence. In addition, private security forces are more likely to manipulate services to the benefit of their employers, and are less likely to report against them or to testify against them (UNODC, 2007). In some circumstances, this leads to the wealthy taking advantage of the poor, even being violent towards the poor, with relative impunity (Haugen & Boutros, 2014).

The justice and penal systems in the Northern Triangle countries are known recruitment camps and training grounds for gang participation and narcotraffickers (Cruz, 2011; IHRC, 2007; Perez, 2006; Rodgers, 2009; Wolf, 2007). The prison systems are extremely overcrowded and have been accused of human rights violations including mental and physical abuse (IHRC, 2007). They allow gangs to congregate in a single location where they are able to expand their power and increase their operational capacity (IHRC, 2007). Many of those brought into the justice system are never charged with a crime. "The criminal justice system in Guatemala fails to convict 94 percent of the criminal suspects brought into the system – with the vast majority of cases being dropped before the case even appeared before the first instance judge" (Haugen & Boutros, 2014, p. 144). The combination of poor law enforcement systems, the failure of judicial systems, and the known issues of the penal systems leads to an environment of near lawlessness in the Northern Triangle nations, which primarily impacts the poor (Haugen & Boutros, 2014; UNODC, 2007).

The high level of corruption and lack of transparency in these systems is particularly concerning given that in lower-middle income countries where financial resources are limited, high incidences of violence result in the diversion of resources to police and penal systems at the expense of other important systems, such as health and education (Haugen & Boutros, 2014; Heinemann & Verner, 2006; Meddings et al., 2005; Moser & McIlwaine, 2006; Serrano-Berthett, 2011). As Meddings et al. (2005) state, “The net result of [a] historical backdrop of neglect set against a complex problem such as youth violence, which demands coherent multisectoral strategies, is a severely hampered capacity of healthcare and public health sectors to engage in the prevention of youth violence in the settings that need to do so the most” (p. 261). These issues are exacerbated by extortion and corruption such as the bribery or intimidation of public servants, which further weakens the functionality of such systems (Haugen & Boutros, 2014; Moser & McIlwaine, 2006). Violence also has an impact on policy-making, since violence exacerbates the difficulties of collecting government revenue and distorts public spending.

The issue of perverse and poorly functioning law enforcement, penal, and judicial systems and the impact of crime on governance are perhaps the most pressing issues facing the Northern Triangle in addressing citizen security. High levels of corruption, an inability to enforce the law, and the violent measures taken by the police and military have led to a severe schism between the public and the government. In 2005, 80 percent of Central Americans believed that the general population did not obey the law (UNODC, 2007). “The natural response to low levels of service and high levels of corruption is for people to avoid contact with agents of the state whenever possible. The rich pay bribes when it is profitable to do so, such as in avoiding taxes. Tax avoidance starves the public coffers. It also fuels further income inequality, which is highly associated with further crime and has a negative effect on growth and development” (UNODC, 2007, p. 83). Corruption leads to greater poverty as the wealthy who can afford to pay bribes have greater access to services and public goods that are then diverted away from the poor. “In this way, corruption can directly prevent the delivery of education, health services, electrification and water services, and justice to those who most need them.” (UNDOC, 2007, p. 83).

Youth Violence Intervention Strategies

With the many factors that influence youth violence across economic, social, political, and epistemic spheres and from the household to the transnational level, intervention strategies will also have to cross key sectors to make an impact on this growing problem. It is important to recognize that

any interventions targeted at a single sector will not be enough to slow the growing youth violence problem. Rather, multi-sectoral and multi-level interventions will be necessary. This section will investigate some of the current intervention strategies as well as the arguments that these initiatives may not be enough to stem the tide of youth violence.

Education-Based Interventions

Studies show that education-based interventions are highly successful as a preventative measure for youth violence (UNESCO, 2012; USAID, 2010). In one such study across 62 nations, it was found that higher levels of education are correlated with lower levels of violence (USAID, 2010). Similarly, the completion of secondary education is highly correlated with greater access to economic and social opportunity (UNESCO, 2012). “For example, research shows that 68 percent of Caribbean males aged 12 to 18 years were not connected to family or school (formal education) and engaged in violent behaviors. Statistical models show that if these males were to become connected to an educational program, the estimates of violence would be reduced by 28 percent” (USAID, 2010, p. 4, citing UN/World Bank, 2007).

Improving the relationship between teachers and students, increasing the relevance of education, and bolstering student self-esteem have been shown to be effective in keeping students in school and in decreasing youth violence in the community (UNESCO, 2012; 2012b; USAID, 2010; Weaver & Maddaleno, 1997).

Another educational pathway is to work directly with youth over a long term to improve self-esteem, facilitate leadership, and create a sense of belonging (USAID, 2010; WOLA, 2008). Youth leadership training builds the capacity of youth to participate in groups and community decision making, as well as to create groups with their own motives and agendas. These may include sports teams, clubs, school businesses, or other groups that fit the needs of the community youth. The purpose of these interventions are to provide youth with spaces to exercise their leadership skills, increase their participation and self-esteem, and become visible in the community as valued contributors.

Interventions such as these have been shown to promote youth development, encourage students to remain in school and active within the community, improve community relationships, and prevent youth violence (Umaña & Ridders, 2012; USAID, 2010). “To address issues of youth and gang violence, in the short run policy makers should borrow from the evidence-based toolkit of programs from other regions, such as early childhood development and mentoring programs, interventions to increase retention of high-risk youth in secondary schools, and opening schools after hours and on weekends to offer activities to occupy youth’s free time” (Serrano-Berthet, 2011).

Community-based prevention interventions are very important in the context of the Northern Triangle, particularly in regards to gang violence. “The most successful gang prevention programs are those that are community led and bring together diverse actors such as schools, local government, healthcare centers, religious institutions and police” (WOLA, 2008, p. 3). The most effective strategies take place through tailoring interventions to the community and through collaboration between local agencies, NGOs, local governments, and other local institutions such as schools and churches. With this in mind, the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) (2008) identifies community mobilization and community capacity building as two key strategies in creating tailored interventions. One such organization is “Grupo Ceiba,” in Guatemala. Grupo Ceiba’s outreach programs “are based on consistent, direct intervention in affected communities to earn the trust of at-risk youth. The programs are aimed at developing ‘organic’ local youth leaders and fostering peer-to-peer mentoring. Along with this outreach to youth, Ceiba does broader community work to strengthen community awareness about the root causes of youth violence and to break down negative stereotypes of gang-involved youth” (WOLA, 2008, p. 32).

The Grupo Ceiba program uses a multi-step approach to engage at-risk youth in their program. They first use a peer-to-peer model by walking through the community and building relationships with youth in their own spaces. Once a relationship is established, they invite the youth to participate in a soccer game. This is their gateway to engaging youth in other programs. Once a youth becomes involved with the program they can participate in peer-to-peer group counseling programs, leadership training, sporting events, and are involved in monitoring their own communities. Coupled with this program are multiple types of educational opportunities that focus on providing life skills and job skills to the participants. These alternative educational opportunities begin at the primary school level. This may seem early, but there is evidence that in the Northern Triangle young people voluntarily or are forced to join gangs as early as eight or nine years of age (WHO, 2010). In addition, the earlier interventions take place the more likely they are to prevent aggression and improve social skills (WHO, 2010). Recreational activities, day care centers, online education, technical education, and business education are all programs offered by the organization in areas that have high violence and high risk of youth involvement in violence (WOLA, 2008). The group also works towards changing the perception of youth as violent within the community. This is an important step in addressing the pervasive fear of youth as well as the feeling of youth as excluded from the community.

Similar groups exist in Honduras and El Salvador, and focus on similar strategies including peer-to-peer relationships, the provision of services (particularly health, mental health, and education), and

repair of the relationship between youth and the community. The biggest challenges to these organizations are a lack of funding, an inherent danger in working in areas of high violence and gang presence, and an extremely high need for services (WOLA, 2008). In addition, the poor economic situation of these countries makes placing those who have gained job skills difficult. This can work in direct opposition to the aims of these organizations, as the perceived economic benefits of gangs are one of the most recognized drivers of youth participation in gangs and violence (WOLA, 2008).

USAID (2010) identified several types of programs that have reduced youth violence and promoted pro-social behaviors in Latin America. It divides the interventions into formal and non-formal education programs. A comprehensive list of these educational programs is presented in Appendix A. Formal educational programs include quality enhancement, conditional-cash transfer (CCT), extracurricular, school-based, and life skills programs. Each type is described below:

- **Quality enhancement** programs focus on improving repetition and dropout rates in primary and secondary education programs in Latin America. This is particularly important when it comes to the education of young males, as there are high attrition rates between primary and secondary school in all three Northern Triangle countries (UNESCO, 2012). There are also very high repetition rates among young men at all stages of education (UNESCO, 2012). “Establishing an expectation of a high quality educational experience, involving parents and communities as active partners, adopting equitable school rules and policies, and preventing school violence are just some of the ways that schools can promote attendance and staying in school among children and youth” (USAID, 2010, p. 10).
- **Conditional cash transfer** programs provide money to families in poverty with the condition that the family sends their children to school and use basic health care services. Some of these programs focus on female children, but more recently these programs have focused on both male and female children. According to the World Bank, CCT programs have been shown to be effective in keeping children in school and promoting attendance (World Bank, 2007). CCT programs have been established in both Honduras and Guatemala (USAID, 2010). These programs aim to address the connection between low school attendance and poverty.
- **Extracurricular** programs aim to provide youth with activities that will fill their time and enrich their life skills and education after or before normal school hours. These may include sports activities, tutoring, mentoring, clubs, music, art, technical skills, or other activities.
- **School-based violence prevention** programs focus on improving the capacity of school personnel and on providing services for youth. These programs work with parents, teachers,

administration, and students including programs to improve teaching skills, relationships between youth and adults, and parenting skills. One such program, “Opening Spaces,” in Brazil resulted in “a 60 percent reduction in violence and reduced rates of sexual aggression, suicide, substance abuse, theft, and armed robbery” (USAID, 2010).

- **Life skills** programs “use a case work approach to provide intensive counseling to targeted students and include a wide range of extracurricular activities and social support along with community policing and juvenile justice interventions. Evaluations have shown the success of these programs in reducing engagement of violent crime, drug use, and association with delinquent peers” (USAID, 2010, p. 10).

Non-formal programs include accelerated learning, holistic, youth workforce development, and gang violence prevention programs. Each is described briefly in turn below:

- **Accelerated learning** programs, such as EDUCATODOS in Honduras, has seen success in providing basic education to poor, underserved, and rural areas. The EDUCATODOS program is perhaps one of the most well-known in Central America. It works by leveraging volunteers, often students in the ninth grade who must fulfil their social service requirement to facilitate a curriculum. The curriculum includes both life and academic skills and is targeted at any person in the community who has not completed primary or basic education, moving the participants through the grade levels. At the end of the program, the participants receive a diploma equivalent to a traditional school diploma. “The program has been evaluated positively in terms of increased access to education, performance, and cost-effectiveness” (USAID, 2010, p. 11).
- **Youth workforce development** programs focus training youth in the skills that they need to gain employment. This includes job skills, life skills, technological skills, and other relevant skills depending on the region and the job market. Some countries in South America have had success in youth workforce development programs with a job placement component for at-risk youth. This strategy has not been attempted at any significant level in the Northern Triangle countries.
- **Gang violence prevention** programs “target ex-gang members and parolees to prevent further gang violence. Approaches include street outreach worker programs and re-entry strategies for former prisoners and ex-gang members” (USAID, 2010, p. 13). These programs include services such as mental health, substance abuse, job skills training, and more. In some instances, the programs also provide services to help protect ex-gang members from retaliation for leaving the gang. Research on these programs find that they have a significant impact on reducing violence in target areas and reduce the return of parolees to penal institutions (USAID, 2010).

Public Health-Based Interventions

Another approach to combatting violence is through public health interventions. This is particularly important as a young person who has experienced violence in the household or community is more likely to perpetuate violence themselves. These interventions aim to decrease violence at the household level, in particular (Fraser, 2012; Guerra, 2005). The public health focus on interventions also aims to address the epistemic normalizing of violence that is evident in the region. For example, 27 out of 40 university students in Honduras report having witnessed a murder, and 19% of a 2009 survey in Latin America report that they know a child that has been abused by a relative in the past month – a number that jumps to 29% in Guatemala (Fraser, 2012). Similarly, many in the region do not consider yelling, spanking, hitting a child, or striking a child with an object as abuse (Fraser, 2012).

Interventions focused on addressing these issues use strategies such as health-brigade home visits, after-school programs for teenagers, and crisis intervention to diffuse disputes. This latter intervention has shown great success in violent areas of the United States and is being attempted in Latin America. “The programme aims to interrupt the “transmission” of violence by training neighbourhood residents who are trusted by members of groups that engage in violence to defuse situations before they escalate into more shootings. The ultimate goal is to change community behaviours to create a healthier environment” (Fraser, 2012, p. 1297). Interventions are also addressed to parents with the aim of providing support for parents to reduce child abuse and domestic violence by conducting house visits for the first five years of a child’s life, economic help, parenting classes, access to childcare, and early-childhood development programs (Fraser, 2012; Guerra, 2005; USAID, 2010; WHO, 2010). Fraser (2012) states that while these interventions show promise, they are not enough in the public health domain, and a greater focus on law enforcement – particularly for violence against women and children — and better identification and intervention in child abuse cases discovered through the public health system. Additionally, more rigorous research needs to be conducted on the long-term effect of these programs on violence as youth reach young adulthood. To date, there are few studies, particularly in Latin America, that follow these programs long term and that look at violence as an outcome measurement (WHO, 2010).

Gender-Based Violence Interventions

Often inequalities in gender increase the risk of acts of violence by men against women. For instance, traditional beliefs that men have a right to control women make women and girls vulnerable to physical, emotional and sexual violence by men... For decades, therefore, promoting gender equality has been a critical part of violence prevention. This has included interventions that confront the entrenched beliefs and cultural norms from which gender

inequalities develop, and efforts to engage all sectors of society in redressing these inequalities, both of which are thought to reduce gender-based violence. (WHO, 2010; pp. 81-82)

Interventions that focus on gender dynamics are an extremely important route to combatting youth violence. These interventions aim to affect social norms such as the association of violence and the subjugation of women with manliness or being “macho” (WHO, 2010). Education-based initiatives that challenge gender stereotypes, work with peer groups, and work with both males and females have been shown to have positive results in changing attitudes towards gender-based violence. Programs that work specifically with male peer groups on violence, particularly sexual violence, have shown some promise in reducing violence towards women. Similar programs that use media to distribute messaging about gender have had some success in changing attitudes. Currently, the majority of interventions in the Northern Triangle have not been followed empirically to determine if they actually reduce violence, but rather focus on the attitudes surrounding violence. More research needs to be conducted to see if the perceived changes in attitudes are leading to decreases in gender-based violence (WHO, 2010).

Other gender-based interventions focus on changing men’s perception of masculinity and on the cultural and social norms that support and perpetuate violence. There are multiple ways of addressing these issues including media campaigns and work with male peer networks. One such intervention in Nicaragua used a telenovela (soap opera) format aimed at addressing topics such as HIV/AIDS, gender-based violence, and women’s rights. The show was coupled with a radio program that allowed viewers to call in and discuss the issues raised in the show. Evaluations of the program showed that exposure to the program resulted in greater acceptance of gender equality; however, evaluations did not measure violence outcomes (WHO, 2010, p. 101). “Violent behaviour is strongly influenced by cultural and social norms; so efforts to prevent violence must consider how social pressures and expectations influence individual behaviour. Interventions that attempt to alter cultural and social norms to prevent violence are among the most widespread and prominent. Rarely, however, are they thoroughly evaluated, making it currently difficult to assess their effectiveness” (WHO, 2010, p. 106).

Governance and Crime Prevention-Based Interventions

Issues related to the impact of poor governance, corruption, and poorly functioning and perverse service systems and institutions dominate the literature on youth violence. As such, no citizen security intervention strategy will be sufficient without addressing these issues. As discussed above, citizen security refers to a comprehensive approach to addressing violence. This includes a focus on traditional methods of fighting crime such as law enforcement, judicial, and penal systems but with a

greater focus on the capacity, functionality, and transparency of these systems. There is great complexity in addressing youth violence through governance and crime prevention interventions. As discussed above, it is widely reported that the relationship between law enforcement and the public in the Northern Triangle countries is fractured at best and predatory at worst. This poor relationship is largely due to rampant corruption, the explicit targeting of youth, a history of mass arrests, and the tough *mano dura* laws. In addition, the intensification of crackdowns on drug traffickers has resulted in an increase in violence rather than a decrease. As such, there is significant work to be done in improving the law enforcement systems in the Northern Triangle.

“Successful crime-fighting strategies elsewhere offer some hints for Central America. One common thread of these earlier successes is action across a broad front. This demands an inclusive coalition of agencies and individuals across governments as well as civil society. Law enforcement and prevention efforts, on their own, simply will not work” (Serrano-Berthet, 2011, p. 23). Serrano-Berthet (2011) suggests that a broad-front approach to fighting crime will require a national crime reduction plan, a coordinating body, strong political backing, and a coordinated effort at gaining the involvement of community and social organizations. In many case, law enforcement officers have inadequate training. There is frequently a substantial lack of officers with more specialized skills such as investigators and forensic specialists (Haugen & Botrous, 2014). In addition to crime fighting policies and strategies, considerable effort should be placed in the training and capacity building of law enforcement agents (Serrano-Berthet, 2011; Haugen & Botrous, 2014). In order for crime-fighting strategies to be effective, these issues must be addressed. “The criminal justice sector, including the judiciary, prosecutors, public defenders, police and prisons, must all be strengthened by executive branch initiatives on crime prevention, alternative dispute resolution, education, poverty reduction and youth development” (Serrano-Berthet, 2011, p. 23).

The control of weapons is another approach suggested by the World Health Organization (2010). “The vast majority of current evidence focuses on the use of national or local legislation to control the purchase, sale and use of lethal means. Legislation which effectively controls access to lethal means can reduce both homicides (involving firearms) and suicides (firearms and pesticides)” (WHO, 2010, p. 74). Despite the promise of these interventions, the restriction of firearms requires policy-level intervention as well as cooperation at the municipal and community level. There has been some success with community-led initiatives to control firearms, but these results can taper off over time due to the long-term sustained effort required. As such, firearm control interventions require collaboration and partnership between various levels of government and among organizations. In addition, these

interventions do not work in isolation, but rather must be a part of a larger strategy to reduce crime and improve law enforcement and judicial systems (WHO, 2010).

Economic Strategies

Many articles and reports stress the connection between poverty and crime and violence in the Northern Triangle countries. Interestingly, there is little evidence in the literature of interventions that specifically aim to reduce violence through economic-based interventions. Some notable exceptions are CCT programs, which serve to reduce violence by keeping students in school and reduces the impetus to drop out of school to join a gang or participate in delinquent behavior. Youth workforce development programs aim to provide youth with marketable job skills and the life skills necessary to succeed in employment. However, few programs specifically aim to reduce poverty with the goal of also reducing youth violence. A greater focus on the connection between poverty, violence, and poverty alleviation measures are an important key to citizen security strategies. Any citizen security or violence reduction strategy must consider this connection to have a long lasting impact in the region (WHO, 2010).

Recommendations

Throughout this paper, it has been discussed that any intervention strategy aimed at addressing youth violence in the Northern Triangle must be multi-sectoral, multi-spatial, and highly inclusive of both government and the public. As such, it is important to note that any of the interventions discussed above will likely not work in isolation from a comprehensive violence reduction strategy.

When exporting prevention programs that work in developed worlds, it is important to note that “there are clear differences in the application and success of gang prevention programs between those implemented in high income (predominantly western) nations, and those implemented in low- and middle-income nations... Many low- and middle-income countries experience – or have experienced – some form of war or conflict” (Higginson et al., 2013). This is true in both Guatemala and El Salvador. Each country has experienced a recent conflict that has resulted in an underlying fear and sense of distrust of the government and even of community neighbors. This distrust means that the interventions that work in developed nations will not necessarily work within these contexts. In addition, it is important to recognize that it is nearly impossible to leave a gang once a young person has joined. In some areas, refusing to join a gang can result in abuse, murder of family members, or other strong-arm measures (IHRC, 2007). These factors make addressing youth violence in the Northern Triangle particularly complex.

There are many reports and strategy papers that outline recommendations for the reduction of youth violence in the Northern Triangle. Despite this, there are “comparatively few scientifically robust assessments of youth violence prevention in Latin America and the Caribbean” (Moestue, Moestue, & Muggah, 2013, p. 1). Table 11 presents recommendations from the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as well as from other organizations and academic papers:

Table 2: Intervention Recommendations

Domain	Recommendations	References
Governance and Legal Systems	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Institute comprehensive public policies and laws to protect the citizenry. • Strengthen the capacity and ability of political authorities to design, implement, and evaluate public policy on citizen security. • Draw distinctions between national defense as a function of the military and citizen security as a function of police in the legal system. • Protect and implement the right to due process and judicial protection. • Institute laws and policies addressing gender-based violence. • Reduce corruption and strengthen the effectiveness of the judicial system. • Implement policies and laws that address youth violence from both punitive and preventative perspectives. • Frame domestic violence policies within gender equity policies. • Provide for programs and funding that guarantee a fundamental right to education, health, and employment. 	ECLAC, 2009; Fraser, 2012; Haugen & Boutros, 2014; IACHR, 2009; Umaña & Rikkers, 2012; Serrano-Berthet, 2011; WHO, 2010
Law Enforcement	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Improve the selection, training, capacity, and transparency of citizen security personnel and in particular those in law enforcement, the judiciary, and penal institutions. • Train, regulate, and maintain transparent the police force, ensuring that all the police act to prevent, deter, and lawfully suppress acts of violence and crime against all citizens. • Modernize and professionalize the police force. • Implement special bodies within the police force who specifically deal with child and youth issues. • Implement special bodies within the police force who specifically deal with violence against women. • Promote training that specifically addresses issues regarding gender-based violence, gender equity, domestic violence, and intimate partner violence. • Create and promote viable alternatives to punitive justice systems for youths convicted of lesser criminal offenses. 	ECLAC, 2009; Haugen & Boutros, 2014; IACHR, 2009; Umaña & Rikkers, 2012; Serrano-Berthet, 2011; Weaver, 1999; WHO, 2010
Transparency and Victim's Rights	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Implement accountability systems and procedures for all authorities who have a role in citizen security. • Implement standards of protection for vulnerable groups. • Implement systems and measures to offer rapid and appropriate care for victims. 	ECLAC, 2009; Haugen & Boutros, 2014; IACHR, 2009; WHO, 2010

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establish legislative and administrative procedures to ensure the right to privacy and the protection of honor and dignity, such as non-invasive searches and transparent procedures. Enable the public to participate in matters related to citizen security such as improving the quality of services, systems to oversee public authorities, and strengthening democracy. 	
Social	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Design and implement plans and programs in social, community, and situational prevention that aim to address the factors that promote violent behavior. Plans should include prevention of domestic violence, programs for youth, control of access to firearms, and awareness and media campaigns. Promote positive community groups and organizations for youth peer groups such as sports groups, youth volunteer groups, and arts programs. Establish and promote mentoring programs for at-risk youth. 	ECLAC, 2009; Guerra, 2005; IACHR, 2009; Umaña & Ridders, 2012; USAID, 2010; Weaver, 1999; WHO, 2010
Public Health	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Develop relationships between children and caregivers to reduce household violence. Reduce youth availability of alcohol and firearms. Implement violence prevention awareness programs for the public and lawmakers. Build and strengthen prevention programs between health and law enforcement institutions. Implement parenting programs aimed at improving the relationship between children and caregivers and reducing intrafamilial violence. Provide for home visitation programs to promote health, safety, and positive parenting practices – particularly in the early years of life. Provide for holistic intervention for vulnerable groups including the homeless, substance abusers, victims of sexual exploitation, and those who live in highly violent areas. Create and promote programs for the rehabilitation and social inclusion of former gang members, members of other violent groups, and those who were formerly incarcerated. 	Fraser, 2012; Guerra, 2005; Umaña & Ridders, 2012; Weaver, 1999; WHO, 2010
Gender-Based Violence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement programs to promote gender equality. Implement public awareness and media campaigns to raise awareness about gender-based violence and attitudes towards gender norms. Implement law enforcement procedures and programs specifically to address the victims of gender-based violence. 	ECLAC, 2009; Moestue, et al., 2013; WHO, 2010
Education	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Implement school programs aimed at keeping students involved in school including sports, clubs, and other extracurricular activities. Implement life skills programs, initiatives on gender norms and attitudes, and similar programs for children and youth. Lengthen the school day and/or provide access to programs after regular school hours. Implement school reintegration programs, alternative schooling programs, distance learning programs, and other “second chance” avenues to continue education, particularly for those who may have left school early. Implement school programs that teach pro-social behaviors and are aimed at preventing violence and delinquency. 	ECLAC, 2009; Guerra, 2005; Moestue, et al., 2013; UNESCO, 2012; USAID, 2010; Serrano-Berthet, 2011; Weaver, 1999; WHO, 2010; WOLA, 2008

	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase education on basic human rights. • Promote interaction and collaboration between schools, families, and the community. 	
Economic	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increase international aid and development funding for resources and technical support for violence reduction. • Implement programs to reduce poverty drivers. • Invest in job skills training and life skills training. Couple such programs with job placement programs. • Implement and promote microenterprise development programs. • Implement CCT programs focused on keeping both girls and boys in school and continuing on to secondary education. 	ECLAC, 2009; Moestue, et al., 2013; USAID, 2010; WHO, 2010
Public Outreach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use media to promote positive parenting and pro-social youth behavior, change perceptions of the acceptability of violence, and to address underlying gender norms and behaviors that promote violence. • Promote an open dialogue and debate between local governments and the public on the issue of youth violence, including an effort to raise public awareness of the issue in the media from a constructive perspective. • Implement media campaigns to promote peace and coexistence. 	ECLAC, 2009; Moestue, et al., 2013; Weaver, 1999
Research	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invest in research on violence and violence prevention. • Increase empirical research and evaluation on youth violence intervention strategies across all domains. • Increase research on the epidemiology of youth violence. 	ECLAC, 2009; WHO, 2010

Appendix A: Summary of Types of At-Risk Youth Interventions in Education from USAID

Intervention	Program Activities	Project Examples	Strength of Evidence	Select Projects and Impact Evaluations
Formal Education (In School and Extracurricular)				
Quality Enhancement	Teacher training Active and cooperative learning Parent/Community involvement	Aprendens	Strong	USAID, 2010
Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT)	Cash Incentives Academic support Health education Peer education and counseling Life Skills Curriculum Parent/Community Involvement	PROGRESA/Mexico Bolsa Familia/Brazil PRAF/Honduras	Strong	Cunningham et al., 2008 Glewwe & Kassouf, 2010 Glewwe & Olinto, 2004
Extracurricular Mentoring Programs	Life Skills Curriculum Tutoring Peer Education Sports & Poetry & Arts Parent/Community Involvement	Superate Big Brother, Big Sister	Strong	Dubois et al., 2001
School-based Violence Prevention	Life skills curriculum Teacher training Classroom reconstruction Peer education Extracurricular and sports activities	Safe Schools Open Schools America Scores	Strong	UN/World Bank, 2007 IADB, 2005 Wilson, 2001
Life Skills Curriculum and Activities	Life skills curriculum Teacher training Mentoring, tutoring and counseling Extracurricular and sports activities	PATHS CASASTART	Moderate	CPPG, 2002 Belenko & Murray, 2005
Non-formal Education (Out of School)				
Accelerated Learning	Education Equivalency Facilitator Training Educational materials and support	EducaTodos	Strong	Kraft, 2009 USAID, 2010
Holistic Positive Youth Development Programs	Life Skills curriculum Education Equivalency Health & Microfinance Technical/vocational training Apprenticeships/Internships Peer Education Labor market services	SERVOL IDEJEN	Strong	SERVOL, 2002 USAID El Salvador, 2011 IADB, 2007
Youth Workforce Development	Life Skills curriculum Education Equivalency Technical/vocational training Apprenticeships/Internship Labor market services Peer Education Community Service	A GANAR JOVENES Youth Build	Moderate to Strong	USAID, 2010 USAID, 2011a Cunningham et al., 2007 IDB, 2005 IDB, 2009 Hoffman et al., 2011
Gang Violence Prevention	Street Outreach Support Reentry services to past offenders or former gang members Violence “interrupters” interventions	CeaseFire Chicago Project Choice	Moderate	YEF Institute, 2012

Source: USAID, 2010, p. 9

Appendix B: Data Tables

Table 3: Intentional Homicides per 100,000 Persons

Country	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Belize	29.8	29.8	33	33.9	35.1	32.2	41.8	39.2	44.7	--
Costa Rica	6.6	7.8	8	8.3	11.3	11.4	11.3	10	8.5	8.4
El Salvador	45.8	62.2	64.4	57.1	51.7	70.9	64.1	69.9	41.2	39.8
Guatemala	36.4	42.1	45.3	43.4	46.1	46.5	41.6	38.6	39.9	--
Honduras	53.8	46.6	44.3	50	60.8	70.7	81.8	91.8	91	84.3
Mexico	8.5	9	9.3	7.8	12.2	17	21.8	22.8	21.5	18.9
Nicaragua	12	13.4	13.1	12.8	13	14	13.5	12.5	11.3	--
Panama	9.3	10.8	10.8	12.7	18.4	22.6	20.6	20.3	17.2	17.2
Latin America/ Caribbean (developing only)	--	--	--	20.2	21.7	22.9	23.5	24.3	23.5	--
Latin America/ Caribbean (all income levels)	--	--	--	19.9	21.5	22.3	22.6	24.8	24.4	--
Lower-Middle Income Countries (Worldwide)	4.2	4.6	4.6	4.6	4.3	4.3	4.5	4.8	6	--

Source: UNODC, 2015; World Bank, 2015

Table 2: Intrafamilial Violence in Guatemala by Year, Top Four Types* (excluding homicide), and Aggressor

Year	Total					Physical & Psychological					Psychological					Physical					Physical, Psychological & Financial				
	Spouse/ Partner	Ex-Spouse/ Partner	Parent	Sibling	Other	Spouse/ Partner	Ex-Spouse/ Partner	Parent	Sibling	Other	Spouse/ Partner	Ex-Spouse/ Partner	Parent	Sibling	Other	Spouse/ Partner	Ex-Spouse/ Partner	Parent	Sibling	Other	Spouse/ Partner	Ex-Spouse/ Partner	Parent	Sibling	Other
2009	22,618	3,991	1,120	918	2,850	10,244	1,395	364	365	1,003	5,334	1,439	390	276	1,113	3,235	317	140	143	298	1,769	296	89	50	102
2010	22,623	3,907	1,144	1,049	3,294	10,688	1,558	384	425	1,212	4,962	1,337	405	325	1,116	3,122	287	173	157	438	1,974	299	83	56	194
2011	23,279	4,198	1,297	1,219	3,491	10,787	1,444	450	481	1,263	5,438	1,658	470	384	1,329	2,961	296	470	193	395	2,108	315	69	77	149
2012	24,579	4,946	1,234	1,348	4,000	11,635	1,699	424	540	1,437	5,745	1,971	473	424	1,577	2,803	306	139	201	392	2,394	382	79	80	166
2013	23,892	5,024	1,322	1,418	4,514	10,570	1,610	446	570	1,545	6,166	2,130	551	466	1,875	2,885	321	152	205	487	2,287	369	69	69	120

* Not included in the table are sexual, financial, physical & sexual, psychological & financial, sexual & financial, physical & psychological & sexual, psychological & sexual & financial, physical & sexual & financial, and physical & psychological & sexual & financial. Included are the top four most commonly reported forms of intrafamilial violence from the years 2009-2013. Source: INE, 2015

Data for Figure 4:

Table 3: Sex and Age Breakdown of Intentional Homicide Victims in El Salvador by Percentage

Demographic		2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Sex	Male	85.7	85.6	85.6	91.2	92.4
	Female	14.2	14.4	13.2	8.2	7.5
	Unidentified	0.1	0.0	1.3	0.6	0.1
Age	0-14	2.3	2.4	2.1	1.3	1.8
	15-29	52.5	52.8	49.3	51	53.1
	30-44	29.6	30.3	31.8	30.8	31.8
	45-59	8.9	9.3	9.2	8.2	8.6
	60+	4.0	3.3	5.0	4.6	3.2
	Unidentified	3.0	2.1	1.3	4.0	1.5

Source: DACE, 2012a; 2012b; 2013; 2014a; 2014b

Data for Figure 5:

Table 4: Sex and Age Breakdown of Sexual Assault Victims in El Salvador by Raw Number and Percentage

Category and Number		2009		2011		2013	
		F	M	F	M	F	M
Type	Rape of a minor	266	0	203	0	142	0
	Rape	1,784	141	1,908	129	1,718	112
	Other sexual assault	683	103	599	90	707	114
	Without evidence	544	113	457	86	572	126
	Total	3,277	357	3,167	305	3,139	352
Age*	0-14	54.0%		54.0%		54.8%	
	15-29	36.7%		39.9%		37.3%	
	30-44	6.8%		4.8%		5.8%	
	45-59	1.8%		1.3%		1.5%	
	60+	0.7%		0.7%		0.5%	

* Based on available data – the raw numbers in the source material for age gave a smaller number of total assaults, likely because of issues in original reporting. 2009 percentages are based on 2,467 assaults reported on age.

Source: DACE, 2012c; 2014c; ISDEMU, 2010;

Data for Figure 6:

Table 5: Sex and Age Breakdown of Intentional Homicide Victims in Guatemala by Percentage

Demographic		2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
Sex	Male	88.9	88.3	88.9	88.9	87.5
	Female	11.1	11.7	11.1	11.1	12.5
Age	0-14	-	2.1	1.7	2.2	2.0
	15-29	-	49.1	49.5	46.3	47.1
	30-44	-	31.3	32.5	32.9	32.9
	45-59	-	16.1	10.7	12.0	11.3
	60+	-	0.0	3.7	4.4	4.4
	Unidentified	-	1.3	1.9	2.2	2.3

Source: INE, 2015

Data for Figure 7:

Table 6: Criminal Complaints in Guatemala by Year, Sex of Perpetrator, Type (excluding homicide), and Location

Location

	Public order			Person(s)			Property			Sexual/Moral			Other			Total Crimes		
Year	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
2009	637	84	721	3,803	1,345	5,148	806	123	929	5,209	216	5,425	2,525	141	2,666	12,980	1,909	14,889
2010	1,212	175	1,387	4,910	1,910	6,820	1,104	114	1,218	6,065	341	6,406	1,299	84	1,383	14,646	2,646	17,292
2011	1,195	131	1,326	4,992	2,601	7,593	1,244	238	1,482	5,573	368	5,941	1,695	198	1,893	14,711	3,539	18,250
2012	1,230	127	1,357	5,126	3,065	8,191	1,272	225	1,497	5,544	469	6,013	1,935	234	2,169	15,107	4,120	19,227
2013	1,769	179	1,948	5,510	3,093	8,603	1,362	242	1,604	6,850	501	7,351	2,313	228	2,541	17,804	4,243	22,047
	Urban						Rural						Unknown					
Year	M		F		T		M		F		T		M		F		T	
2009	7,408		976		8,384		5,441		917		6,358		131		16		147	
2010	7,999		1,326		9,325		6,181		1,101		7,282		466		219		685	
2011	7,989		1,724		9,713		5,980		1,341		7,321		742		474		1,216	
2012	8,426		2,187		10,613		5,827		1,375		7,202		854		558		1,412	
2013	10,647		2,174		12,821		6,244		1,524		7,768		913		545		1,458	

Source: INE, 2015

Data for Figure 8:

Table 7: Victims of Intrafamilial Violence in Guatemala by Year, Sex of Victim, Top Four Types* (excluding homicide), and Aggressor

Year	Total			Physical & Psychological			Psychological			Physical			Physical, Psychological & Financial		
	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T	M	F	T
2009	2,985	28,512	31,497	820	12,551	13,371	1,380	7,172	8,552	276	3,857	4,133	152	2,153	2,305
2010	2,858	29,159	32,017	870	13,397	14,267	1,194	6,951	8,145	337	3,840	4,177	153	2,453	2,606
2011	2,906	30,578	33,484	905	13,520	14,425	1,260	8,019	9,279	301	3,713	4,014	144	2,574	2,718
2012	2,967	33,140	36,107	925	14,810	15,735	1,348	8,842	10,190	290	3,551	3,841	131	2,970	3,101
2013	3,252	32,918	36,170	969	13,772	14,741	1,528	9,660	11,188	288	3,762	4,050	147	2,815	2,962

* Not included in the table are sexual, financial, physical & sexual, psychological & financial, sexual & financial, physical & psychological & sexual, psychological & sexual & financial, physical & sexual & financial, and physical & psychological & sexual & financial. Included are the top four most commonly reported forms of intrafamilial violence from the years 2009-2013 Source: INE, 2015

Table 2: Intrafamilial Violence in Guatemala by Year, Top Four Types* (excluding homicide), and Aggressor

Year	Total					Physical & Psychological					Psychological					Physical					Physical, Psychological & Financial				
	Spouse/ Partner	Ex-Spouse/ Partner	Parent	Sibling	Other	Spouse/ Partner	Ex-Spouse/ Partner	Parent	Sibling	Other	Spouse/ Partner	Ex-Spouse/ Partner	Parent	Sibling	Other	Spouse/ Partner	Ex-Spouse/ Partner	Parent	Sibling	Other	Spouse/ Partner	Ex-Spouse/ Partner	Parent	Sibling	Other
2009	22,618	3,991	1,120	918	2,850	10,244	1,395	364	365	1,003	5,334	1,439	390	276	1,113	3,235	317	140	143	298	1,769	296	89	50	102
2010	22,623	3,907	1,144	1,049	3,294	10,688	1,558	384	425	1,212	4,962	1,337	405	325	1,116	3,122	287	173	157	438	1,974	299	83	56	194
2011	23,279	4,198	1,297	1,219	3,491	10,787	1,444	450	481	1,263	5,438	1,658	470	384	1,329	2,961	296	470	193	395	2,108	315	69	77	149
2012	24,579	4,946	1,234	1,348	4,000	11,635	1,699	424	540	1,437	5,745	1,971	473	424	1,577	2,803	306	139	201	392	2,394	382	79	80	166
2013	23,892	5,024	1,322	1,418	4,514	10,570	1,610	446	570	1,545	6,166	2,130	551	466	1,875	2,885	321	152	205	487	2,287	369	69	69	120

* Not included in the table are sexual, financial, physical & sexual, psychological & financial, sexual & financial, physical & psychological & sexual, psychological & sexual & financial, physical & sexual & financial, and physical & psychological & sexual & financial. Included are the top four most commonly reported forms of intrafamilial violence from the years 2009-2013. *Source: INE, 2015*

Data for Figure 9:

Table 8: Sex and Age Breakdown of Intentional Homicides in Honduras by Percentage

Age	2010			2011			2012			2013			2014		
	F	M	Total	F	M	Total	F	M	Total	F	M	Total	F	M	Total
0-14	0.3	1.2	1.5	0.4	1.0	1.3	0.5	1.3	1.8	0.7	1.5	2.2	0.7	1.2	1.9
15-29	2.6	45.2	47.8	3.4	43.6	47.1	3.6	44.6	48.2	4.3	44.4	48.7	3.7	45.1	48.8
30-44	2.0	30.8	32.8	2.1	32.1	34.2	2.6	30.1	32.7	2.6	27.6	30.2	2.6	28.2	30.8
45-59	0.9	11.3	12.2	1.0	11.0	12.0	1.2	10.9	12.1	1.1	10.7	11.8	1.2	9.9	11.1
60+	3.9	0.3	4.2	0.3	3.5	3.8	0.4	3.5	3.8	0.6	3.4	4.0	0.4	3.6	4.0
Unidentified	0.1	1.4	1.5	0.1	1.6	1.7	0.1	1.3	1.4	0.2	3.0	3.2	0.2	3.2	3.4
TOTAL	9.8	90.2		7.2	92.8		8.4	91.6		9.4	90.6		8.9	91.1	

Source: UNAH-IUDPAS 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015

Data for Figure 10:

Table 9: Sex and Age Breakdown of Reported Sexual Assault Victims in Honduras by Number and Percentage

Age	2010			2011			2012			2013			2014		
	F	M	Total	F	M	Total	F	M	Total	F	M	Total	F	M	Total
0-14	1,357	233	1,590	1,546	232	1,778	1,406	225	1,631	1,467	221	1,688	1,189	162	1,351
15-29	1,163	163	1,326	1,130	75	1,205	1,104	40	1,144	974	47	1,021	871	12	883
30-44	119	63	182	86	17	103	106	3	109	84	0	84	91	0	91
45-59	30	19	49	27	4	31	17	1	18	21	0	21	18	1	19
60+	13	4	17	14	4	18	9	0	9	6	0	6	20	0	20
Unidentified	8	5	13	8	3	11	6	3	9	9	1	10	6	0	6
TOTAL by #	2,690	487	3,177	2,811	335	3,146	2,648	272	2,920	2,561	269	2,832	2,195	175	2,370
TOTAL by %	84.7	15.3		89.4	10.6		90.7	9.3		90.4	9.5		92.6	7.4	

Source: UNAH-IUDPAS 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015

Data for Figure 11:

Table 10: Sex and Age Breakdown of Assault and Battery Victims in Honduras by Percentage

Age	2010			2011			2012			2013			2014		
	F	M	Total	F	M	Total	F	M	Total	F	M	Total	F	M	Total
0-14	685	635	1,320	399	392	791	446	472	918	524	545	1,069	387	333	720
15-29	3,034	2,399	5,433	2,067	2,447	4,514	2,093	2,579	4,672	2,087	2,513	4,600	1,734	1,651	3,385
30-44	1,685	1,287	2,972	1,193	1,488	2,681	1,157	1,602	2,759	1,207	1,501	2,708	1,003	1,103	2,106
45-59	517	577	1,094	444	577	1,021	453	678	1,131	421	624	1,045	374	474	848
60+	177	218	380	184	248	432	207	279	486	167	293	460	167	224	391
Unidentified	36	33	69	29	46	75	23	50	73	19	30	49	12	13	25
TOTAL by #	6,134	5,149	11,283	4,316	5,198	9,514	4,379	5,660	10,039	4,425	5,506	9,933	3,677	3,798	7,477
TOTAL by %	54.4	45.6		45.4	54.6		43.6	56.4		44.6	55.4		49.1	50.8	

Source: UNAH-IUDPAS 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015

Data for Figures 12 and 13:

Table 11: Criminal Complaints in Honduras by Year and Type (excluding homicide)

Property Crimes													
Year	Theft	Robbery	Robbery of Store/ Business	Robbery of Delivery Truck	Robbery of a Bank	Robbery of a Person(s)	Robbery of a car	Robbery of a Home	Theft of a Weapon	Theft of a Cellular Phone	Theft of animal or livestock	Theft of a Car	Total
2010	4,414	8,514	1,320	737	32	1,802	463	1,279	894	1,408	326	3,497	24,686
2011	3,670	8,485	1,229	647	36	2,013	225	1,422	849	2,046	345	4,131	25,098
2012	3,779	8,887	832	237	278	960	329	867	1,609	364	1,017	3,631	22,790
2013	2,193	5,946	251	128	6	361	78	582	593	1,426	268	2,291	14,123
2014	2,999	10,141	189	796	2	363	63	546	659	2,639	361	2,436	21,194
Violent Crimes													
Year	Assault	Kidnapping	Attempted Kidnapping	Attempted Rape	Rape	Domestic Violence	Interfamilial Violence	Total					
2010	4,667	76	8	423	1,761	7,742	3,321	17,998					
2011	4,160	48	10	409	1,684	6,978	3,468	16,757					
2012	3,922	56	3	478	1,900	7,154	3,042	16,555					
2013	2,208	34	7	259	1,164	4,276	2,131	10,079					
2014	3,064	34	50	298	1,205	5,265	2,470	12,386					

Source: UNAH-IUDPAS 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015

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